We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable.
Introduction
In multi-winner elections, the goal is to select a subset of candidates (i.e., a committee) of a pregiven size, such as electing parliaments, shortlisting job candidates or choosing public locations for a set of facilities, such as hospitals or fire stations . In this paper we generalize and examine the concept of social acceptability of candidates, which has been introduced by Mahajne and Volij (2018a) for single-winner elections context, to multi-winner election setting.
Consider a set of candidates. We say that a voter places a given candidate above the line if she prefers her to at least half of the candidates, and she places her below the line if at least half of the candidates are preferred to her. 3 We say that a candidate is socially acceptable with respect to a given preference profile, if she is placed above the line by at least as many voters as those who place her below the line. To be socially unacceptable, may be a significant weakness for a candidate, because this means that more voters place this candidate in their least favorite half of the candidates rather than in their most favorite half.
Social acceptability of committees is defined in this paper as follows. Given a preference profile, we say that a committee is socially acceptable if all its members are socially acceptable, and it is completely unacceptable if all its members are socially unacceptable and it is partly unacceptable 4 if some of its members are unacceptable. In multi-winner elections, to be a socially unacceptable committee may be a significant disadvantage, because this means that all or some of the committee members are socially unacceptable, as shown for instance in Example 1 later. A socially unacceptable committee may cause dissatisfaction in some sense and a majority of voters may feel disappointed or even skeptical regarding some or all its elected members.
This paper, which extends the work of Mahajne and Volij (2018b) regarding single-winner elections, examines the social acceptability of Condorcet committees. There are several definitions of a Condorcet committee as generalizations of the concept of Condorcet winner. One of them, which we consider in this paper, is due to Gehrlein (1985) . A Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein is a committee such that every one of its members beats every non-member by a majority (Aziz et al., 2017; Coelho, 2004; Elkind et al., 2015; Kamwa, 2017) .
We show that in general, a Condorcet committee may be partly and even completely unacceptable.
However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size does not exceed a certain number, then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, and if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then it may be socially acceptable but may not. Single-crossingness, which can guarantee Condorcet winner to be socially acceptable (Mahajne and Volij, 2018b) , cannot guarantee Condorcet committee (of size 2 or more) to be socially acceptable.
These previous types of preferences may be not likely to exist; therefore we also evaluate the probability of a Condorcet committee to be socially unacceptable under the commonly used assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC). This assumption, introduced by Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976) , is a commonly used hypothesis in the literature of social choice theory when computing the theoretical likelihood of electoral events, and stipulates that all voting situations (defined later) are equally likely to be observed. Our results show that in general, under IAC, Condorcet committees are exposed to social unacceptability to a significant extent. For instance, when there are six candidates, then about 80 percent of the voting situations lead to a Condorcet committee of size four are expected to be partly or completely unacceptable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic definitions.5 Section 3 states and proves theoretical results regarding social acceptability of Condorcet committees. Section 4 presents the results regarding the probability evaluations of having a socially (un)acceptable Condorcet committee under IAC assumption, and Section 5 concludes.
Definitions
Let = { 1 , 2 , … , } be a set of ≥ 3 candidates and let = {1, . . . , } be a set of ≥ 3
voters. We consider a framework where each voter is assumed to have a linear order ≻ on , from the most desirable candidate to the least desirable one. Let be the set of all linear orders on . We refer to the elements of as preference relations. We denote by the preference profile of the voters, it is summarized by a list = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ ) of preference relations, where for each voter ∈ , ≻ represents 's preference relation over the candidates in . We denote by the set of preference profiles. Let  be a preference profile, for any subset ⊆ of preference relations, ( ) = |{ ∈ : ≻ ∈ }| is the number of voters whose preferences are in . Also, ( ) = {≻∈ : ∃ ∈ . . ≻ = ≻} denotes the set of different preference relations that are present in the profile . For any preference relation ≻∈ , the inverse of ≻ is the preference relation ≻ −1 defined by
⇔ ≻ . Let = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ ) be a preference profile, the inverse profile of is the profile −1 = (≻ 1 −1 , . . . , ≻ −1 ). Let , ′ ∈ be two candidates. Denote by ( ≻ ′) = {≻∈ : ≻ ′} the set of preference relations according to which is preferred to ′. Along this paper, when we write for instance ≻ = ( 1 2 . . . ), we mean that 1 is placed first in ≻ and 2 is placed 5 Mainly, we use similar basic definitions as in Mahajne and Volij (2018b) .
second and so on. For any preference relation ≻ and for any candidate ∈ , the rank of in ≻, is defined as: ≻ ( ) = − |{ ′ ∈ : ≻ ′}|. Candidates whose ranks in ≻ are less than ( + 1)/2 are said to be placed above the line by ≻ and candidates whose ranks are greater than ( + 1)/2 are said to be placed below the line by ≻, and candidates whose ranks are equal to ( + 1)/2 are said to be placed on the line by ≻. For instance, if = 4 and a voter's preference relation is given by 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 , then she places candidates 1 and 2 above the line and candidates 3 and 4 below the line. In this example, no candidate is placed on the line because the number of candidates is even.
We are interested in multi-winner elections where we need to elect a fixed size subset of candidates (a committee) from the given set of candidates . Let ( < ) denote the committee size or cardinality, and let ( ) = {ℂ 1 , . . . , ℂ } be the set of all -size committees of . A multiwinner voting rule is a function that assigns to each preference profile , a -size subset of .
The concept of social acceptability has been introduced by Mahajne and Volij (2018a) , for a single-winner elections context: Definition 1 Let be a profile of preference relations, and let ∈ be a candidate. We say that is socially acceptable with respect to if the number of voters that place her above the line is at least as large as the number of voters that place her below the line and otherwise is socially unacceptable. Formally, is socially acceptable with respect to π if and only if
We extend the concept of social acceptability to multi-winner context and present a definition of social acceptability of committees as follows:
Definition 2 Let be a preference profile, and let ℂ ∈ ( ) be a committee. We say that ℂ is socially acceptable with respect to if every committee member ∈ ℂ is socially acceptable with respect to . We say that ℂ is socially partly unacceptable if some of its members are socially unacceptable and some are socially acceptable. We say that ℂ is socially completely unacceptable if all its members are socially unacceptable.
6
6 Henceforth, we sometimes may use in short "partly unacceptable" and "completely unacceptable", without "socially".
Social acceptability of Condorcet committees

General
We now provide the definition of Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein, and later we examine the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, especially under some common preference restrictions such as single-peakedness. Before, we present a definition of Condorcet winner:
Definition 3 Let be a preference profile, and let ∈ be a candidate. We say that is a (strong)
Condorcet winner with respect to π if and only if:
The definition of Condorcet winner has been extended to multi-winner context in different ways, one of them is due to Gehrlein (1985) : A committee ℂ ∈ ( ) is a Condorcet committee à la
Gehrlein if each member in this committee beats each non-member by a majority. Formally,
Definition 4
Let be a preference profile, and let ℂ ∈ ( ) be a committee. We say that ℂ is a
Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein with respect to π if and only if:
The Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein does not always exist, and as pointed by Diss et al. (2018) , it has been suggested in order to avoid committees with dominated members. For more information on Condorcet committee, the reader can refer in particular to Barberà and Coelho (2008) , Kamwa (2017) , and Ratliff (2003) .
The first Proposition of this paper shows that when there are 3 candidates, every Condorcet committee of size 1 (i.e., a Condorcet winner) must be socially acceptable, and every Condorcet committee of size 2 can be socially acceptable or partly unacceptable but it cannot be completely unacceptable. However, when there are more than 3 candidates, all the situations are possible.
7 If we replace ">" by "≥", then we say that it is (weak) Condorcet winner, and when we write "Condorcet winner'' we mean (strong) Condorcet winner, unless we write "weak". Proof: Denote:
and denote (∀ = 1, … ,6 ): j = |{ ∈ : ≻ =≻ j }|. We prove now the first statement. Let = 1 and let (w.l.g) be a (strong) Condorcet winner (it must exists, otherwise ℂ will be empty). In this case, ℂ = { }, thus we obtain that: ( ( ≻ ′)) ≥ ( ( ′ ≻ )) ∀ ′ ∈ \{ }. 
socially acceptable, and thus ℂ is socially acceptable.
The second statement. Since = 2, we consider (w.l.g) that ℂ = { , }. In this case, one of them ( w.l.g) must be a (weak) Condorcet winner, i.e., ( ( ≻ ′)) ≥ ( ( ′ ≻ )) ∀ ′ ∈ \{ } (otherwise, ℂ will be empty). But, by the proof of the first statement, must be socially acceptable.
Therefore, at least one member of ℂ is socially acceptable. The next example shows that for = 3 and = 2, ℂ can be socially acceptable or partly unacceptable.
Example 1 Let = { , , } and consider the following two profiles: Example 2 Let = { , , , } and consider the following four profiles: ), then we obtain in Example 1, that under 3 , { , }, which is socially acceptable, is a committee which yields best total satisfaction level of 2, whereas the Condorcet committee { , } yields negative total satisfaction level of −2.
After the previous analysis of the relationship between social acceptability and Condorcet committees, now we will focus on the relation between q-Condorcet committee and social acceptability. We define and propose the q-Condorcet committee principle as a generalization of the well-known q-Condorcet winner to the multiwinner setting. We follow the definition of Baharad and Nitzan (2003) and Courtin et al. (2015a,b) who define the q-Condorcet winner as a candidate who is never beaten by another candidate with a fraction q of the number of voters.
Definition 5 Let be a preference profile, and let ℂ ⊂ be a committee of size . For ∈ ( 1 2 , 1),
we say that ℂ is a − (à la Gehrlein) with respect to if for every candidate ∈ ℂ and every candidate ′ ∈ \ℂ the number of voters that prefer to ′ is greater than a fraction q of the number of voters. Namely, if
The next proposition shows that when is large enough, any − cannot be completely unacceptable or even must be socially acceptable if is too large. Proof : 9 Statement a. Let ℂ = { 1 , … , } be a q-Condorcet committee with respect to and let
for all ∈ ℂ , ′ ∈ \ℂ, we have that
. Therefore, we obtain that
Assume by contradiction that ℂ is completely unacceptable. There are two cases:
Case 1: K is even. Then, ∀ ∈ ℂ there is a proportion < 1/2 of voters that place above the line and a proportion 1 -of voters that place below the line. Let ′ be the preference profile that is obtained from by sending the candidates in ℂ to the (in the upper half of ) of each preference relation that places them above the line, and by sending the candidates in ℂ to the top places of the lower half of (i.e., in the top places of { /2 + 1, . . . , } starting just below the 9 Following the proof of Proposition 1 in Mahajne and Volij (2018b) .
line) of each preference relation that places them below the line. By construction, ℂ is still completely unacceptable and ( ) ≤ ′ ( ) for all ∈ ℂ.
When sending to the top places of the upper half, she obtains − "wins" on non-member candidates (i.e., she is preferred to − non-member candidates) and when sending to the top places of the lower half, she obtains at most ( /2 − 1) "wins" on non-member candidates.
Therefore for all ∈ ℂ,
Since < 1/2, and since ( − 2 + 2) > 0, 10 we have that:
Therefore, we have that:
This contradicts inequality 1.
Case 2: K is odd. ∀ ∈ ℂ, there is a proportion < 1/2 of voters that place above the line and a proportion of voters that place below the line ( < ). Let ′ be the preference profile that is obtained from by sending the candidates in ℂ to the (in the "upper half" of ) of each preference relation that places them above the line, and by sending the candidates in ℂ to the top places of the lower half of (i.e., in the top places of {( + 1)/2 + 1, . . . , }, starting just below the line) of each preference relation that places them below the line. By construction, ℂ is still completely unacceptable, and by a previous argument we have
Since < 1/2, and since
Therefore, + −1 ). Therefore, we obtain that
Assume by contradiction that ℂ is (at least) partly unacceptable. There are two cases:
Case 1: K is even. Then, ∀ ∈ ℂ there is a proportion ≤ 1 of voters that place above the line and a proportion 1 -of voters that place below the line. Let ′ be the preference profile that is obtained from by sending the candidates in ℂ to the (in the upper half of ) of each preference relation that places them above the line, and by sending the candidates in ℂ to the top places of the lower half of (i.e., in the top places of { /2 + 1, . . . , }, starting just below the line) of each preference relation that places them below the line. By construction, ℂ is still partly unacceptable and ( ) ≤ ′ ( ), ∀ ∈ ℂ. By a previous argument we have
Since for at least one (assume w.l.g = 1 ) < 1/2, and since ( − 2 + 2) > 0, 11 we have that:
). Since for > 1, ≤ 1, we have that:
Therefore,
This contradicts inequality 2.
Case 2: K is odd. Then, ∀ ∈ ℂ there is a proportion < 1/2 of voters that place above the line and a proportion of voters that place below the line. Let ′ be the preference profile that is obtained from by sending the candidates in ℂ to the (in the "upper half" of ) of each preference relation that places them above the line, and by sending the candidates in ℂ to the top places of the lower half of (i.e., in the top places of {( + 1)/2 + 1, . . . , }, starting just below the line) of each preference relation that places them below the line. By construction, ℂ is still not socially acceptable, and by a previous argument we have ∀ ∈ ℂ 
Since for at least one (assume w.l.g = 1 ), < and < 1/2, and since ( − 2 − 1) > 0, we have
Since for > 1, ≤ 1, β ≤ 1, we have that
The bounds 0 and 1 cannot be improved. To check this, let = 4 and = 2, so that the bounds are 0 = 3/4 and 1 = 7/8. We focus on 0 , so let < 3/4. We will construct a preference profile for which the committee { , } is a − but is completely unacceptable. Let be a positive integer such that < 9 /(12 + 1) and let be a preference profile with: 2 voters with preference ( ), 2 voters with preference ( ), 2 voters with preference ( ), 2 voters with preference ( ), voters with preference ( ), voters with preference ( ), voters with preference ( ), voters with preference ( ), and 1 voter with preference ( ). The number of voters is = 12 + 1. The number of voters who prefer each one of { , } to each one of { , } is 9 . Therefore, { , } is a − , but is completely unacceptable because each one of { , } is placed above the line by 6 voters and below the line by 6 + 1 voters.
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The main message of the previous results is that the Condorcet (and the q-Condorcet) committee and social acceptability are two notions which may be difficult to conjugate. As a result, in the next sections we focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees under some common domain conditions. We consider four cases which are extensively studied in the literature of social choice 
Condorcet committees under Single-peaked preferences
The class of single-peaked preferences, first introduced by Black (1948) , is perhaps the most extensively studied type of domain restrictions. Roughly speaking, a set of preference relations are single-peaked with respect to a given linear order of the candidates if each preference has a peak such that for any two candidates on the same side of the peak, one is preferred over the other if she is closer to the peak. Formally, Definition 6 Let ≤ be a linear order on the set of candidates . We say that the preference relation ≻ is single-peaked with respect to ≤ if there is a candidate ∈ (denoted also (≻)) such that
If < we say that is to the left of or that is to the right of .We denote the set of all preferences that are single-peaked with respect to ≤ by (≤). We say that the profile = (≻ 1 , . . . , ≻ ) is single-peaked with respect to a linear order ≤ on , if all the preferences in ( ) are single-peaked with respect to ≤. The next claim is useful, Claim 1 Let ≤ be a linear order on and assume without loss of generality that 1 < ⋯ < . Let ≻ be a single-peaked with respect to ≤. Let , , ∈ any three candidates such that < < ,
then it holds that: ( ≻ ) ⇒ ( ≻ ) and ( ≻ ) ⇒ ( ≻ ). And as a result we have that:
Proof : The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Fix a linear order ≤ on , the following lemma states first that for any candidate who is not the "middle candidate" with respect to ≤, there is another candidate (we call her the ) such that for any single-peaked relation ≻ with respect to ≤, is placed above the line if and only if is preferred to . Also it states that the number of candidates which are located, with respect to ≤, "between" any candidate and her counter is at least ( + 1)/2. 
Proof : The proof is presented in Appendix C.
The next claim shows that under single-peaked profile, if ℂ is a Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein, then for any two candidates in the committee, it must be that every candidate which is "between" them is also in the committee.
Claim 2 Let ≤ be a linear order on and assume without loss of generality that 1 <. .
. < . Let be a preference profile of single-peaked preferences with respect to ≤, and let ℂ = { 1 , … } ∈ ( ) be a Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein with respect to . Then ℂ is a continuous with respect
to ≤, i.e., ∄ ∈ such that: < < for some , ∈ ℂ and ∉ ℂ.
Proof : The proof is presented in Appendix B.
The next Corollary shows that under single-peaked profile, if ℂ is a Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein, then for any candidate in ℂ, its counter (denoted by ( )) cannot be in the committee ℂ.
Corollary 1 Let ≤ be a linear order on the of candidates A and assume without loss of generality that 1 <. . . < . Let π be a single-peaked preference profile with respect to ≤, and let ℂ = { 1 , … } ∈ ( ) be a Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein with respect to and |ℂ| < ( + 1)/2.
Let be any candidate such that ≠ ( +1)/2 and M(a) is the counter of (according to Lemma 1).
Then there cannot be the case that ∈ ℂ and ( ) ∈ ℂ.
13 As it is shown in the proof, if = for some ≤ ⌈ Proof: Assume by contradiction that ∈ ℂ and ( ) ∈ ℂ . By Claim 2, ℂ is continuous, consequently we obtain that: If < ( ) then { ∈ : ≤ ≤ ( )} ⊆ ℂ, and thus |{ ∈ : ≤ ≤ ( )}| ≤ |ℂ|, but by statement 2 of Lemma 1, |{ ∈ : ≤ ≤ ( )}| ≥ ( + 1)/2, thus |ℂ| ≥ ( + 1)/2, which contradict the assumption that |ℂ| < ( + 1)/2. If ( ) < then { ∈ : ( ) ≤ ≤ } ⊆ ℂ and thus |{ ∈ : ( ) ≤ ≤ }| ≤ |ℂ| but by statement 2 of Lemma 1, |{ ∈ : ( ) ≤ ≤ }| ≥ ( + 1)/2, thus |ℂ| ≥ ( + 1)/2, which also contradict the assumption that |ℂ| < ( + 1)/2. ∎
The next Proposition shows that if the preferences are single-peaked with respect to some linear order on and the committee size is not "too large", then a Condorcet committee must be socially Proof: Statement (1). Assume |ℂ| < ( + 1)/2. First, if there is any ∈ ℂ such that ≠ ( +1)/2 , then by Lemma 1 there is ∈ (it is ( ) the counter of ) such that for all ≻∈ (≤),
). Since ∈ ℂ, then by Corollary 1, ∉ ℂ, and since ℂ is a Condorcet committee, we must have that
That is, is socially acceptable with respect to . Now, if there is any ∈ ℂ such that = ( +1)/2 (in this case must be odd), then it must be that ≻ ( ) ≤ ( + 1)/2 for all ≻∈ (≤), because otherwise (i.e., if ≻ ( ) > ( + 1)/2), and since ≻ is single-peaked with respect to ≤ , we must have one of the two cases,
In case (1), there will be at least = ( + 1)/2 candidates with ≻ (. ) > ( + 1)/2, which is more than ( − 1)/2, but this is impossible (it must be exactly ( − 1)/2).
In case (2), there will be at least − + 1 = − ( + 1)/2 + 1 = ( − 1)/2 + 1 candidates with ≻ (. ) > ( + 1)/2, which is more than ( − 1)/2, but this is impossible. Therefore, ({≻: ≻ ( ) > ( + 1)/2}) = 0, and consequently, ({≻:
≻ ( ) > ( + 1)/2. That is, is socially acceptable. Thus, we proved that for any ∈ ℂ (regardless of her location with respect to ≤), is socially acceptable. Consequently, ℂ is socially acceptable with respect to .
Statement 2. Assume |ℂ| ≥ ( + 1)/2. First we show that at least one Condorcet committee member must be socially acceptable. This results comes immediately from the proof of statement 1.
Since is single-peaked, we obtain that a (weak) Condorcet winner, which exists, must be in ℂ,
because otherwise ℂ will be empty. Let be a (weak) Condorcet winner ( ∈ ℂ). According to the
Consequently, ({≻: 
Condorcet committees under Single-caved preferences
The concept of single-caved preferences was introduced by Inada (1964 Inada ( , 1969 . A set of preference relations are single-caved with respect to a given linear order of the candidates if each preference relation has a "cave" candidate such that for any two candidates on the same side of the "cave", one is preferred over the other if she is more distant from the "cave". On the other side, single-caved preference profiles are generated from single-peaked profiles by inversing the preference relation of each voter. As pointed by Barberà et al. (2012) , single-caved preferences can arise, for instance, in the presence of an undesirable suggested project or policy, like construction of a prison. In this case, for a voter, the worst location may be the closest to his home, and as the location is further away it is more desirable. Formally, Definition 7 Let ≤ be a linear order on the set of candidates . We say that the preference relation ≻ is single-caved with respect to ≤ if there is a candidate ∈ (denoted also, (≻)) such that
If < we say that is to the left of or that is to the right of . We denote the set of all preferences that are single-caved with respect to ≤ by (≤). We say that the profile is singlecaved with respect to a linear order ≤ on , if all the preferences in ( ) are single-caved with respect to ≤.
The next claim, regarding single-caved preferences, is useful:
Claim 3 Let ≤ be a linear order on the set of candidates and assume without loss of generality that 1 < ⋯ < . Let ≻ be a single-caved with respect to ≤.
Let , , ∈ any three candidates such that < < , then it holds that: The following lemma states that for any candidate that is not "middle candidate" with respect to ≤, there is another candidate (we call her the ) such that for any single-caved relation ≻ with respect to ≤, is above the line if and only if is preferred to . 
2) If we denote by ( ) the counter of , then it holds that:
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E.
The next example illustrates the two statements of the lemma.
Example 4 The next claim shows that under single-caved profiles, if ℂ is a Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein, then ℂ is "left continuous" (i.e., for any member of ℂ which is "left to the middle", every other candidate which is left to her must be also in ℂ) and also it is "right continuous" (i.e., for any candidate in ℂ which is "right to the middle", every other candidate which is right to her must be also in ℂ). Proof: Assume |ℂ| < ( + )/ . If ∈ ℂ then by Claim 4 it must be that ≠ ( +1)/2 . So, assume that there is ∈ ℂ such that ≠ ( +1)/2 , then by Lemma 2 there is ∈ (it is ( ) the counter of ) such that for all ≻∈ (≤), ≻ ( ) < ( + 1)/2 ⇔ ≻ . Consequently, ({≻ : ≻ ( ) < ( + 1)/2}) = ( ( ≻ )). Since ∈ ℂ, then by Corollary 2, ( ) ∉ ℂ (i.e., ∉ ℂ), and since ℂ is a Condorcet committee, we must have that: ( ( ≻ )) > ( ( ≻ )).
Claim 4 Let
Hence,
( ( ≻ )) ≥ /2. Therefore, ({≻: ≻ ( ) < ( + 1)/2}) ≥ /2. consequently, ({≻: ≻ ( ) <) < ( + 1)/2}) ≥ ({≻: ≻ ( ) >) < ( + 1)/2}), namely is socially acceptable. Consequently, ℂ is socially acceptable with respect to . Now, assume |ℂ| ≥ ( + )/ . First, we show that at least one Condorcet committee member must be socially acceptable. This results from the proof of statement (1). Since is single-caved, we obtain that a (weak) Condorcet winner, which exist, must be in ℂ, because otherwise ℂ will be empty. Let be a (weak) Condorcet winner. Since ∈ ℂ then by a previous argument in the proof, ≠ ( +1)/2 , but then by Lemma 2, there is ∈ such that ∀≻∈ (≤), ≻ ( ) < ( + 1)/2 ⇔ ≻ . Consequently, ({≻: ≻ ( ) < ( + 1)/2 }) ≥ ({≻: ≻ ( ) > ( + 1)/2}). That is, is socially acceptable. Therefore, at least one member of ℂ must be socially acceptable, that is ℂ cannot be completely unacceptable with respect to . The next example completes the proof and shows that a Condorcet committee can be socially acceptable or partly unacceptable with respect to single-caved profile.
Example 5 Let = { , , } and consider the following two single-caved profiles with respect to the 
Condorcet committees under Single-crossing preferences
The concept of single-crossing preferences was introduced by Mirrlees (1971) and Roberts (1977) .
For other explanations, see for instance Saporiti and Fernando (2006) . Informally speaking, a set of preferences on the candidates satisfy the single-crossing property if both these preferences and the candidates can be ordered from left to right so that if a rightist preference prefers a left candidate to a right candidate, then so do all preferences that are to the left of it. Formally, Definition 8 Let be the set of candidates and let ≤ be a linear order on . Let ⊆ be a nonempty subset of preferences and let ⊑ be a linear order on . We say that the preference relations in satisfy the single crossing property with respect to (≤, ⊑) if for all pairs of candidates , ∈ and for all pairs of preferences ≻, ≻ ′ ∈ , we have
If < we say that is to the left of or that is to the right of , and if ≻ 1 ⊏≻ 2 we say that ≻ 1 is to the left of ≻ 2 or that ≻ 2 is to the right of ≻ 1 . We say that the profile satisfies the single crossing property if there is a linear order ≤ on and a linear order ⊑ on the set ( ) of preferences in the profile, such that the preferences in ( ) satisfy the single crossing property with respect to (≤, ⊑).
The next example illustrates the definition. The next definition of median preference is useful for the following proposition.
Definition 9 Let ≤ be a linear order on , and let ⊑ be a linear order on . Let be a profile of preferences that satisfies the single-crossing property with respect to (≤, ⊑). We say that ≻ ∈ ( )
is a median preference relation of if and only if ({≻∈ ( ): ≻⊑≻ }) ≥ /2 and ({≻∈ ( ): ≻ ⊑≻}) ≥ /2.
Since the profile satisfies the single-crossing property with respect to (≤, ⊑), the set of preferences ( ) is ordered by ⊑ and a median relation ≻ ∈ ( ), always exists.
The next proposition states that if the preference profile satisfies the single-crossing property, then a Condorcet committee can be socially acceptable or partly unacceptable, but it cannot be completely unacceptable.
Proposition 5 Let ≤ be a linear order on and let ⊑ be a linear order on . Let be satisfies the single-crossing property with respect to (≤, ⊑), and let ℂ ∈ ( ) be a Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein with respect to , then ℂ can be socially acceptable with respect to or partly unacceptable but it cannot be completely unacceptable.
Proof: first we show that at least one Condorcet committee member must be socially acceptable.
Since satisfies the single-crossing property, there exists a median preference relation ≻ ∈ ( ).
If we denote by the top candidate of ≻ then must be a (weak) Condorcet winner, i.e.,
( ( ≻ )) ≥ ( ( ≻ )), ∀ ∈ \{ )}. It is true because:
 If < then (since ≻ ) we obtain by single-crossing property that ≻ , ∀ such that ≻ ⊑≻ , but these voters are at least /2, thus ( ( ≻ )) ≥ ( ( ≻ )).
 If < then (since ≻ ) we obtain (by single-crossing property) that ≻ , ∀ such that ≻ ⊑≻ , but these voters are at least /2, thus ( ( ≻ )) ≥ ( ( ≻ )).
Therefore, in either case is preferred to by at least /2 voters. Now, by the definition of Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein, and since is a (weak) Condorcet winner, it must be that ∈ ℂ, because if ∉ ℂ, then any ∈ ℂ will not satisfy the requirement: 
Condorcet committees under group-separable preferences
The concept of group-separable preferences was introduced by Inada (1964 The next example illustrates the definition.
Example 8 Let = { , , , } and consider the following profile of 5 voters: {( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )}. We can check that every subset of (of size 3 at least) can be groupseparable partitioned as follows: = [{ }] ∪ [{ } ∪ { , }] (for instance, candidate is placed first or last by all the voters). Also, the committee { , } is a Condorcet committee and is socially acceptable (each one of { , } is above the line by 3 and below the line by 2).
The next proposition, states that when there are more than three candidates, and the preference profile satisfies the group-separable property, then a Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein may be socially acceptable or partly unacceptable, but it cannot be completely unacceptable. However, when there are three candidates and the committee size is 1, then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but when the size is at least 2, then it can be socially acceptable or partly unacceptable but it cannot be completely unacceptable. . The integer j = |{ ∈ : ≻ =≻ j }| being the number of voters endowed with the ℎ corresponding linear order and recall that is the total number of voters. The IAC condition stipulates that all voting situations ̃ are equally likely to be observed. In other words, all combinations of that sum to a specified are equiprobable. This assumption, introduced by Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976) is one of the most used hypothesis in the literature of social choice theory when computing the theoretical likelihood of electoral events. For more details on the IAC condition and others, we refer the reader to Gehrlein and Lepelley (2011, 2017) .
Let 1 , 2 , and 3 the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be partly unacceptable, completely unacceptable, and socially acceptable, respectively. If necessary, for 1 , we will use the notation 1 ( , ̅) with is the number of unacceptable members and ̅ is the number of acceptable members in the considered Condorcet committee. Naturally, + ̅ = .
Three candidates
For three-candidate elections, Proposition 1 shows that every Condorcet committee of size one (Condorcet winner), when it exists, is socially acceptable and a Condorcet committee of size two, when it exists, can never be socially completely unacceptable. The results for the other situations with three-candidate elections are described in Propositions 7 and 8. The proof of each proposition can be formulated as counting the exact number of integer solutions in finite systems of linear constraints with rational coefficients. As pointed out by Lepelley et al. (2008) and Wilson and Pritchard (2007) , Ehrhart polynomials (Ehrhart, 1962 (Ehrhart, , 1967 are the appropriate mathematical concepts to study such problems. Proof: In order to obtain a representation for the probability 1 that a Condorcet committee of size two, when it exists, is socially partly unacceptable under IAC condition, we need to calculate two different values: the number of voting situations for which a Condorcet committee of size two exists and the number of voting situations for which a Condorcet committee of size two is socially partly unacceptable.
We begin first by calculating the number of voting situations for which a Condorcet committee of size two exists. Let , and ≥ 0 is given by the following 2-periodic Ehrhart polynomial: ] , for instance, is a 2-periodic number meaning that it depends on the remainder after division of by 2: it is equivalent to 1 32 if ≡ 0 2 and
The second step is then to introduce the conditions under which the Condorcet committee ℂ = { , } is socially partly unacceptable. Two cases are possible: either is socially acceptable whereas is socially unacceptable or the opposite case. Using the symmetry of IAC with respect to the three candidates, these two cases are similar. Consider (w.l.g) the first case which is equivalent to two additional inequalities applying Definitions 1 and 2: 1 + 2 ≥ 3 + 4 (iii) and 1 + 2 < 3 + 5 (iv). Using again the Parameterized Barvinok's algorithm, the number of integer points inside the h the Parameterized Barvinok's ts inside polytopes wit The free software to calculate the integer poin 15 algorithm can be found in http://freecode.com/projects/barvinok. probability should decrease as the number of voters increases. The probability 1 represents half of the voting situations for large electorates. 
More than three candidates
As noticed by Lepelley et al. (2008) , the parameterized Barvinok's algorithm that can be used in the three-candidate elections does not allow to deal with four candidates and more. However, recent developments within the polytope theory allow us to obtain exact results for the case of four candidates with the algorithm Normaliz (Bruns et al., 2017a) which is, to the best of our knowledge, the only program able to compute the number of voting situations in polytopes corresponding to elections with up to four candidates. The reader is referred to Bruns et al. (2017b) who describe several results obtained in four-candidate elections with Normaliz. Notice that this software needs relatively high memory when the number of voters increases. Consequently, even for the case of four candidates, we can only obtain exact results with small number of voters 3 ≤ ≤ 10. We also obtain exact results for four candidates with infinite set of voters using another method. Indeed, it is well known from the literature that the calculations of the limiting probability under IAC condition are simply reduced to computation of volumes of convex polytopes. For this purpose, our volumes are found with the use of the algorithm Convex which is a Maple package for convex geometry Franz (2017) . The package works with the same procedure that was at first used in Cervone et al. (2005) and recently used in other studies such as Diss and Doghmi (2016) , Gehrlein (2012, 2015) , Gehrlein etal. (2015) , and Moyouwou and Tchantcho (2017) .For all remaining calculations, that is = 4 with a finite number of voters > 10 as well as = 5 and = 6, computer simulations are used. We describe in the following the Monte-Carlo simulation methodology that we apply in order to estimate our probabilities. As an illustration let us consider the probability 3 of social acceptability of a Condorcet committee of size .
-Step 1: At the beginning of the simulation, we randomly generate a voting situation of length !.
-Step 2: We check whether the considered voting situation of step 1 generates a Condorcet committee of size or not.
-
Step 3: If a Condorcet committee of size exists in step 2, we check whether the conditions of social acceptability are fulfilled or not.
-Step 4: These three steps are iterated 1,000,000 times.
Step 5: The probability of social acceptability is then calculated as the quotient of the number of voting situations for which a Condorcet committee of size , when it exists, is acceptable divided by the number of voting situations for which a Condorcet committee of size exists.
The results of our computations are provided in Appendix G. Notice that the probability values 0, 1, 0.00000, and 1.00000 have different meanings. The first two correspond to exact values while the last two values are obtained using our simulation method. First, our results show that the probability for a Condorcet committee to be completely unacceptable ( 2 ) is quite negligible in all cases.
Second, our results indicate that the probability 1 is particularly high when the size of the committee is equal or exceeds half the number of the candidates. Clearly, social unacceptability may occur significantly. For instance, when there are six candidates, more than 80% of the voting situations generating a Condorcet committee of size four are expected to be partly unacceptable.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have examined the social acceptability of Condorcet committees in general and particularly under some types of restricted preference domains. As previously noticed, we have considered four types which are the most extensively studied in the literature of social choice theory.
However, we believe that studying other restriction domains is an important research direction. We refer the reader to, for instance, the domain of value-restricted preference profiles (introduced by Sen, 1966 ), or the domain of level r consensus profiles (introduced by Mahajne et al., 2015) . 
Appendix
A. Proof of Claim 1
Let ≻ be a single-peaked with respect to ≤, then there is ∈ such that ∀ , ∈ : ( < ≤ ≤ < ) ⇒ ≻ .
There are 3 cases for : Case 1: < < . There are two situations: < ≤ < and < ≤ < . In the first situation, if ≻ then (by single-peakedness, and < ≤ ) we have also ≻ , consequently, ≻ , and if ≻ then we have as before ≻ . In the second situation, if ≻ , then (by single-peakedness and ≤ < ) we have also ≻ , and if ≻ then we have as before ≻ , and consequently ≻ . Case 2: ≤ . In this case we obtain that ≤ < < , thus it must be (by single-peakedness) that ≻ and ≻ . Case 3: ≥ . In this case we obtain that < < ≤ , thus it must be (by single-peakedness) that ≻ and ≻ .
Therefore, in all cases we obtain:
Similarly we obtain also that ( ( ≻ )) ≤ ( ( ≻ )). ∎
B. Proof of Claim 2
For any , ∈ , let ∆ ( ≻ ) = ( ( ≻ )) − ( ( ≻ )). Assume by contradiction that in there is ∉ ℂ such that < < for some , ∈ ℂ. By Claim 1, if ≻ is single-peaked with
Hence, ( ( ≻ )) ≤ ( ( ≻ )), and therefore, ∆ ( ≻ ) ≤ ∆ ( ≻ ) (1) Also, ( ( ≻ )) ≤ ( ( ≻ )), and therefore,
 If ∆ ( ≻ ) ≤ 0 then (conversely) ∆ ( ≻ ) ≥ 0, and thus by (2), ∆ ( ≻ ) ≥ , but this contradicts the assumption that ℂ is a Condorcet committee and ∈ ℂ and ∉ ℂ, which requires that ∆ ( ≻ ) < .
 If ∆ ( ≻ ) ≥ 0, and thus by (1) ∆ ( ≻ ) ≥ , but this also contradicts the assumption that ℂ is a Condorcet committee and ∈ ℂ and ∉ ℂ, which requires that ∆ ( ≻ ) < . ∎
C. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of statement 1 results from Theorem 1 in Mahajne and Volij (2018b) . However, we present a similar proof with some changes, for the use of statement 2. Let ≠ (  If is on the line by some ≻ (in this case K is odd), then must be above the line by ≻ (and then ≻ ), because otherwise there are 2 sub-cases:
1: < (≻) and then, ∀ ∈ such that < and ∀ ∈ such that ≤ , is also below the line. ⌉ candidates below the line, which is more than ( − 1)/2 but this is impossible.
2: (≻) < and then,∀ ∈ such that < , is also below the line. But, then at least ( − )
candidates will be below the line, which (since ≤ ⌈ −1 2 ⌉) is more than ⌈ −1 2 ⌉ but this is impossible.
As a result, we conclude that, ≻ places above the line if and only if ≻ .  If is on the line by some ≻ (in this case K is odd), then must be above the line by ≻ (and then ≻ ), because otherwise there are 2 sub-cases:
1: > (≻) and then, ∀ ∈ such that > and ∀ ∈ such that ≤ , is also below the line.
But, then it would be at least ( ⌉ but this is impossible.
2: < (≻) and then,∀ ∈ such that < , is also below the line. But, then it would be at least As a result, we conclude that, ≻ places above the line if and only if ≻ .
We now prove Statement 2. By construction of the proof of Statement 1, we obtain that: In both cases we would have at least ( + 1)/2 candidates in { ∈ : ≤ ≤ ( )} (or in { ∈ : ( ) ≤ ≤ }). ∎
D. Proof of Claim 3
The proof that ( ≻ ) ⟹ ( ≻ ) is immediate by the definition of single-caved preference relation and it is left to the reader, thus we obtain: {≻∈ ( ): ≻ } ⊆ {≻∈ ( ): ≻ }.
Consequently, ( ( ≻ ) ≤ ( ( ≻ ))
. Similarly, we obtain that ( ( ≻ ) ≤ ( ( ≻ )). ∎
E. Proof of Lemma 2
First, we prove statement 1. Let ≠ ( +1)/2 . ⌉, but this is impossible.
 If is on the line by some ≻ (in this case K is odd), then must be above the line, because otherwise ∀ ∈ such that ≤ < , is must be also below the line by ≻. But, then it would be at least ( − ( − ⌊ In both cases we would have at least ( + 1)/2 candidates in { ∈ : ≤ ( ) ≤ } or in
F. Proof of Claim 4
We prove now the first statement. Given a profile , denote the set of all candidates which is best in at least one of the preferences in ( ) by: π ( ) = { ∈ |∃ ∈ ∶ ∀ ∈ \{ }, ≻ i }. Since is single-caved profile, it must be that π ( ) ⊆ { 1 , }, and at least one of { 1 , } has first place-frequency (i.e., ({≻: ≻ (. ) = 1})) of at least /2, thus at least one of them must be (weak) Condorcet winner and therefore, at least one of them must be in ℂ, because otherwise ℂ would be empty. Note that for = 3 we obtain that ( + 1)/2 = 2, but since < 2, we have that either ℂ = { 1 } or ℂ = { } depending on the first place-frequency, and the proof is trivial. So, assume now that > 3. There are two cases for 1 :
Case 1: 1 has first place-frequency of at least /2. In this case, 1 ∈ ℂ, because otherwise ℂ would be empty. Now, Let ∈ ℂ (for some 2 < < ( + 1)/2)) we will show that for any 1 < < , ∈ ℂ. Assume by contradiction that ∉ ℂ. Since ∈ ℂ, it must be that ( ( ≻ )) > / 2, but since is single-caved, we obtain by Claim 3 that
Therefore, we obtain that ( ( ≻ )) ≥ ( ( ≻ )) > /2, and consequently it must be that also ∈ ℂ , ∀ > (in addition to 1 and ). In this case we would have that: |ℂ| ≥ − + 1 + 1. But since < ( + 1)/2 we would have that |ℂ| ≥ − + 1 + 1 > ( + 1)/2 + 1, which contradicts the assumption of the claim that |ℂ| < ( + 1)/2.
Case 2: 1 has first place-frequency less than /2. Let ∈ ℂ (for some 1 < < ( + 1)/2)), we will show first that 1 ∈ ℂ. Assume by contradiction that 1 ∉ ℂ. Since ∈ ℂ then by Claim 3, it must be (for any single-caved preference relation) that [ ≻ 1 ] ⇒ [ ≻ , ∀ > ], and consequently ( ( ≻ )) ≥ ( ( ≻ 1 )). Since ∈ ℂ, we obtain ( ( ≻ 1 )) ≥ /2.
Therefore, ( ( ≻ )) ≥ ( ( ≻ 1 )) ≥ /2. Consequently, it must be that [ ∈ ℂ, ∀ > ∀ < ] (because otherwise, ∉ ℂ). In this case, |ℂ| = − + 1, but since < ( + 1)/2 we obtain that |ℂ| > − ( + 1)/2 + 1 = ( + 1)/2, and consequently that |ℂ| ≥ ( + 1)/2 which contradicts the assumption of the claim that |ℂ| < ( + 1)/2. We conclude that 1 ∈ ℂ, but by the proof of case 1, it must be also that ∈ ℂ for every 1 < < . By symmetry, the proof of the second statement is similar and is left to the reader.
We prove now the third statement. Recall that |ℂ| < ( + 1)/2. Let = ( + 1)/2, assume by contradiction that ∈ ℂ, and assume (w.l.g) that for some < ( + 1)/2, ∉ ℂ (there must be such a candidate, since < ). Now, since ℂ is a Condorcet committee, we must have that
must be in ℂ (otherwise cannot be in ℂ), but then by the first statement (of Claim 4), it must be that ∈ ℂ, ∀ > ( + 1)/2, and consequently |ℂ| ≥ ( + 1)/2, which contradicts the assumption of Claim 4. ∎ Table 6 : K = 5 and k = 2 Table 10 : K = 6 and k = 2 
G. Probabilities for more than four candidates
